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Do measurement-related fair value disclosures affect information asymmetry? 
 
Abstract  
Using a sample of European real estate firms over the 2007–2010 period, this study provides 
some evidence that measurement-related fair value disclosures reduce information 
asymmetry. We find a negative association between the extent of fair value disclosures and 
the bid-ask spread, but no association with two additional measures of information asymmetry 
(zero returns and price impact). Contrary to our expectation, we fail to find evidence that 
firms using model estimates exclusively benefit the most from such additional disclosure. 
Analyzing measurement errors (the absolute difference between the selling price of an asset 
and its fair value prior to sale), we find that firms that use model estimates exclusively and 
provide more measurement-related disclosures have lower errors and more accurate fair value 
estimates. In other words, if our lack of results is due to investors not using this additional 
disclosure this is to their detriment. 
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A discussion paper by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB 
2011) reflects the increasing interest of policy makers in measurement-related disclosures. 
Financial reporting, the paper argues, has shifted “from simply providing breakdowns of line 
items on the face of the financial statements to providing more detailed disclosures, including 
disclosures of assumptions, models, alternative measurement bases and sources of estimation 
uncertainty, amongst others.” In this study, we investigate the association among 
measurement-related fair value disclosures and information asymmetry. Increased information 
asymmetry is costly to market participants because it increases the adverse selection problem 
and lowers liquidity. Thus, we posit that disclosures accompanying financial statements 
become more important because they provide information about assumptions and decisions, 
and can reduce investor uncertainty (Schipper 2003, Barth et al. 2008).  
We focus on International Accounting Standard (IAS) 40 in the real estate industry for 
the following four reasons. First, firms can choose to report investment property value at 
historical cost or fair value, and fair value itself can be determined on the basis of several 
different inputs (e.g., market prices, comparable assets or transactions, or model estimates). 
Second, the fair value estimates of investment properties must be reported even when 
historical cost is chosen for the balance sheet (in other words, the fair value of the investment 
property is always made available).  
Third, investment properties have a more developed reference market and more 
developed valuation methodologies than financial assets (Muller et al. 2011). Therefore, the 
fair value model and model estimates are often used. Fourth, investment property is the most 
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material operational asset in the real estate industry; it represents, on average, 73% of total 
assets.1  
Overall, given the complexity of the fair value measurement environment and the 
materiality of the underlying assets, fair value measurement-related disclosures are expected 
to be highly important to capital market participants in our setting. We therefore first 
investigate these disclosures in detail. Second, we investigate the association between 
measurement-related fair value disclosures and the level of information asymmetry. For the 
latter we rely on the general disclosure literature (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Kim 
and Verrecchia 1994, Welker 1995), and on the literature investigating whether the relation 
varies with a firm’s characteristics and economic environment (Armstrong et al. 2011, Lang et 
al. 2012, Bhattacharya et al. 2013). Previous studies have explored which characteristics (e.g. 
investor protection, media penetration, and ownership concentration) can influence the 
relation between financial transparency and information asymmetry. We extend this line of 
research by including the fair value measurement choice as an additional characteristic, i.e. 
using model estimates exclusively, using a combination of model and market estimates or not 
using model estimates.  
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that measurement-related disclosures are 
associated with a larger reduction in information asymmetry when model estimates are used 
exclusively than when other valuation methods are used.  Evidence from the banking industry 
reveals that the value relevance of fair value based on unobservable, firm-generated inputs is 
lower than that for fair value based on observable inputs from quoted prices in active markets 
                                                             
1 Investment property represents 73% of the total assets in our sample, which is similar to the percent 
found in Müller et al. (2015). Investment property represents 72% (80%) for firms using the cost 
model (fair value model) in their sample.  
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or other market-related information (Song et al. 2010). Moreover, it has been argued that fair 
value accounting with extensive disclosures can provide more reliable, timely, and 
comparable information than other approaches, but empirical evidence for this claim is scarce 
(Laux and Leuz 2009, Chung et al. 2014).2  
To test for the association between measurement-related fair value disclosures and 
level of information asymmetry, we manually collect seven disclosure items (e.g., rental 
income, occupancy rate, details on the discount rate, details on comparable transactions) 
related to the investment property measurement choice and the disclosures made. The sample 
consists of 372 firm-year observations (2007–2010) in the real estate industry from nine 
European countries. Our descriptive statistics show that the majority of firms use model 
estimates exclusively. The majority of firms also uses one valuation method, while 31% 
prefers to use a combination of two (29%) or three fair value methods (2%). Model estimates 
are the primary method used in all countries apart from the UK, where market values are used 
more frequently. Over time, we observe a decrease in the choice of market values. Disclosure 
levels vary greatly across countries with Swedish firms disclosing the most and Italian firms 
the least in our sample. Disclosure scores are similar in 2007 and 2008 but improve in 2009 
and 2010. 
We then investigate the relations between measurement-related disclosures, the fair 
value method used and the bid-ask spread, the proportion of zero return days, and the price 
impact as proxies for information asymmetry (Daske et al. 2008, Muller et al. 2011). Using a 
2SLS design, multivariate analyses provide limited evidence that the benefit of the disclosures 
                                                             
2 More recent evidence from the banking industry suggests that, although fair value has been blamed 




is greater when model fair value is used. First, we find a negative association between 
disclosure and the bid-ask spread, but fail to find such association for the proportion of zero 
return days and the price impact. Second, we fail to find consistent evidence in line with our 
hypothesis as results show a negative association with the bid-ask spread when model 
estimates are used exclusively, and a negative association with the proportion of zero-return 
days when model estimates are used exclusively or combined with market inputs. We fail to 
find any association between disclosure and the price impact. 
The lack of consistent results could be partially attributable to reliability differences. 
We therefore follow Muller et al. (2011) and use the measurement error (the absolute 
difference between the selling price and the fair value in the financial statements of the asset 
prior to sale) for a subsample of 184 firms that sold investment properties during the year. 
Investment property fair values are estimates of realizable values and the fair value gains or 
losses are therefore an appropriate benchmark of their reliability (Muller et al. 2011).  Our 
results indicate that firms that use model estimates and provide more measurement-related 
disclosures have estimates that are more accurate and with a smaller magnitude of 
measurement error. This additional analysis shows that if investors do not use these additional 
disclosures this is not in their best interest. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we construct a method-
specific disclosure index and document the measurement-related fair value disclosures for a 
sample of European real estate firms over the 2007–2010 period in detail. Second, we 
investigate the effect of those measurement-related disclosures under IFRS on the level of 
information asymmetry and how this relation varies with the fair value method chosen. We 
provide some evidence that, under certain circumstances, and even absent extensive guidance 
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in a principles-based accounting framework, firms can make useful disclosures to help reduce 
information asymmetry.  
Moreover, our results generally add to Laux and Leuz’s (2009) argument that fair 
value accounting with extensive disclosures can provide more reliable information than other 
accounting approaches. However, note that we do not find consistent evidence, which seems 
contradictory to Laux and Leuz’s (2009) argument.  
Lastly, we contribute to the real estate literature. Previous studies in this industry 
focused mainly on the shift from local GAAP to IFRS, the possible change from historical 
cost to fair value (Muller et al. 2011), the change from IAS40 to IFRS13 (Sundgren et al. 
2016) and on the recognition versus disclosure discussion (Israeli 2015, Müller et al. 2015). 
We extend this literature by examining the association between measurement-related 
disclosures and the level of information asymmetry independent of whether fair value is 
recognized or disclosed. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
standards, while section 3 summarizes previous literature and develops our hypothesis. 
Section 4 discusses our sample selection and data collection, and section 5 presents our 
research design. Our empirical results are in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Fair value reporting for investment properties3 
IAS 40 requires that investment properties be measured at cost, including transaction costs, at 
the time of acquisition (IAS 40.20 and 40.23).4 Subsequent measurement in the balance sheet 
                                                             
3 IAS 40 is the relevant standard throughout our sample period. From 1 January 2013 onward, IFRS 13 
is applicable for fair value measurement. IFRS 13 requires improved quantitative information 
regarding significant unobservable inputs such as the effect of altering an unobservable input and 
sensitivity analysis, which was voluntary under IAS 40.  
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is done at either historical cost (cost model) or fair value (fair value model) (IAS 40.30),5 but 
only one method can be used for the firm’s entire array of investment property. Furthermore, 
when a firm chooses the cost model, fair value must still be disclosed in the notes.6 Therefore, 
whichever measurement is chosen in the balance sheet, the fair value for the investment 
property portfolio must always be provided nevertheless.  
In determining fair value, firms consider current prices in an active market for a 
similar property in terms of condition, nature, and location (IAS 40.45) (the market approach) 
to be the best indicators. In the absence of current prices in an active market, firms can use 1) 
current prices in an active market for properties of a different nature, condition, or location, 
adjusted to reflect those differences, 2) recent prices of similar properties in less active 
markets, again adjusted to reflect any differences in economic conditions (the comparables 
approach), or 3) model estimates based on reliable estimates of future cash flows, supported 
by contract or external evidence, and using discount rates that reflect the current market 
assessment of the level of uncertainty in the amount and timing of cash flows (IAS 40.46) (the 
model approach).7,8,9  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
4 Investment properties are defined as property (land, a building or part of a building, or both) held (by 
the owner or lessee under a financing lease) used for rental income purposes, capital appreciation, or 
both (IAS 40.5).  
5 A change is permitted, but only if it results in a more appropriate presentation. IAS 40 discourages a 
change from a fair value to the cost model. 
6 In contrast, if a firm opts to value investment property at fair value in the balance sheet, historical 
cost can voluntarily be reported in the notes. 
7 This framework differs from IFRS 13, which consists of level 1 (assets that are liquid and have clear 
market prices) to level 3 (illiquid assets that require unobservable inputs and management assumptions 
to estimate) measurements. While the model approach resembles level 3, the comparables approach 
can be considered a level 2 or 3 measurement. 
8 If a real estate firm uses the market approach, it would typically use wording such as: “individual 
property is assessed against recently sold properties in the same segment (location, property type, 
tenant composition, etc.),” and “takes into account evidence of market values of similar properties.” 
Examples of wording used by firms that use comparable assets to measure the investment property are  




This choice is made at the property level. In other words, the standard does not require 
the same fair value method be applied to all investment properties. Although the measurement 
choice in the balance sheet must be the same for the entire portfolio (historical cost or fair 
value), firms can use different fair value methods for different investment properties.  
IAS 40.7510 summarizes the disclosure requirements as follows: An entity shall 
disclose: 1) whether it is applying the fair value or cost model, 2) the methods and significant 
assumptions applied in determining the fair value, including a statement as to whether the 
determination was supported by market evidence or based more heavily on other factors 
(which the entity shall disclose) because of, e.g., the nature of the property or the  lack of 
comparable market data, and 3) the extent to which the fair value (as measured or disclosed in 
the financial statements) is based on a valuation by an independent appraiser who holds a 
recognised and relevant professional qualification and who has recent experience in the 
location and category of the property. If there has been no such valuation, that fact must be 
disclosed. 
 From reading IAS 40, it is obvious that some disclosures can be easily classified as 
compulsory (e.g., not using an independent appraiser, or the cost or fair value model). 
However, while the standard requires assumptions to be disclosed, it does not require a list of 
the disclosures be made. Due to the lack of guidance, firms exercise judgment as to which 
items they disclose in financial statements under IAS 40. However, IAS 1 can help firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
other remaining assumptions.” Finally, an example of model fair value wording is “the fair value is 
based on a net yield calculation, where market rents are capitalized and normative property expenses 
(such as the costs of maintenance, insurance, and expenses) are deducted,” and “based on cash flow 
analysis.” Overall, we carefully read all the financial statement notes in order to identify which method 
was used. 
9  IAS 40.42-47 has been replaced by IFRS 13 (effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2013). 
10 IAS 40.75 was adjusted to incorporate the changes in IAS 40.42-47 after our sample period. 
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better choose which assumptions will be disclosed. The standard mentions that firms must 
disclose information in such a manner that users of financial statements can be reasonably 
expected to understand the judgments management is making about the future, and about 
other sources of estimation uncertainty. 
 
3. Related literature and hypothesis  
We expect disclosure to reduce information asymmetries among informed and uninformed 
investors and possible problems of adverse selection, which will result in improved market 
liquidity (Akerlof 1970, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Kim and Verrecchia 1994). There is 
extensive evidence that better financial transparency results in reduced information 
asymmetry and increased market liquidity.  
Welker (1995) was one of the first studies to document a negative relation between 
disclosure policy and the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity. Healy et al. (1999) add to 
this stream of research, and find that increases in analyst disclosure ratings are accompanied 
by increased liquidity for firms. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)  detect lower bid-ask spreads for 
firms that switch from German to international reporting regimes and thus commit to higher 
levels of disclosure.11 Recent evidence by Balakrishnan et al. (2014) shows that firms provide 
voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and influence liquidity. 
 Other recent studies pay attention to conditional factors in studying the relationship 
between financial transparency and the level of information asymmetry. Lang et al. (2012) not 
only document lower bid-ask spreads and fewer zero-return days for firms with greater 
transparency, but also find that a firm’s level of transparency matters more when particular 
                                                             
11 See Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for an overview. 
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characteristics of the environment create greater uncertainty, i.e., when investor protection, 
disclosure requirements, media penetration and firm-level corporate governance are poor, and 
during times of higher uncertainty (e.g., economic crises).  
We follow this line of research by examining firms’ accounting choices as a 
conditional factor. We investigate the interaction between disclosure and accounting choices 
made on the level of information asymmetry. If certain methods create greater uncertainty, the 
benefit of providing more disclosures will result in a larger decrease in information 
asymmetry. Within our setting, we predict that the different measurement methods will indeed 
create differing levels of information uncertainty.  
For example, in a U.S. setting, level 3 estimates are perceived as less value-relevant 
than levels 1 and 2 fair value, and firms with more level 3 assets exhibit greater information 
risk and higher costs of capital (Song et al. 2010, Goh et al. 2015, Bens et al. 2016) .12 For our 
sample, we expect that fair value based on market inputs will create the least information 
uncertainty, because the information source is the market value, which is externally verifiable. 
Fair value based on model estimates, on the other hand, is based mainly on internal 
information and requires managerial judgment (Hitz 2007), which causes lower 
informativeness (Landsman 2007), higher measurement uncertainty, and higher information 
risk (Riedl and Serafeim 2011).  
 Although the judgment required in the fair value model may create moral hazard 
problems between company insiders and outsiders, previous evidence shows that managers 
are capable of providing good estimates for mortgage service rights (Altamuro and Zhang 
                                                             
12 We do not focus on the recognition-disclosure issue in this study. Previous literature found mixed 
evidence as to whether recognized information has a different impact than disclosed information on 
capital market participants’ behaviour (e.g., Davis- Friday et al. 1999, Ahmed et al. 2006, 
Frederickson et al. 2006, Bratten et al. 2013, Yu 2013, Müller et al. 2015).  
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2013). Thus, we posit that disclosures may help solve information uncertainty. Because 
uncertainty is larger for firms using model inputs rather than market inputs, we expect the 
benefit of disclosures to be larger using the former method. We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis:  
  
HYPOTHESIS 1: More measurement-related disclosures are associated with a larger 
decrease in information asymmetry when model fair value is used exclusively than when other 
valuation methods are used. 
 
4. Sample, data and descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 outlines our sample selection process. We begin by selecting all European 
firm-years in the real estate industry (U.S. SIC code 65) during the 2007–2010 period. Note 
that our sample precedes the adoption of IFRS 13.  Our focus on the real estate industry 
enables us to investigate the usefulness of measurement-related disclosures in a setting where 
the related asset (i.e., investment property) is highly material. Because we hand-collect data 
on investment property valuations and disclosure choices, we require financial statements to 
be available in Dutch, English, German, or French,13 which results in an initial sample of 544 
firm-year observations. We eliminate 64 observations because they lack financial statements, 
do not apply IAS 40, or contain changes in fiscal year-end. We delete another 40 observations 
because information on the fair value measurement choice or the value of the investment 
                                                             
13 We do not introduce Poland or Spain into the sample because full data are available for only one 
firm in those languages. The final sample comprises real estate firms in Belgium, France, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. 
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property is missing.14 After excluding a further 68 observations with missing market data, our 
final sample consists of 372 firm-year observations. The sample distribution by year and 
country is given in Table 1, panel B. Financial and market data come from Datastream. 
 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
 
As mentioned earlier, we read the financial reports of all sample firms in detail, and 
categorize the measurement choices and related disclosures for each firm-year observation. 
Our collection process includes not only reading the corresponding note related to the 
investment property, but also scanning the financial statements in their entirety for fair value-
related disclosures. The collection order is randomized to prevent subjectivity in coding and 
to avoid bias caused by learning effects on the part of the coder. Part of the data is also 
collected again by two alternative coders to verify consistency.  
Our disclosure index is constructed as follows. We first count the number of items a 
firm actually discloses, and then scale by the maximum number of items a firm can disclose 
given the measurement method chosen. The reasoning behind this procedure is that all firms 
can provide details on the market yield and the occupancy rate of the property, but a firm 
using the market or comparables approach can also disclose details on the properties used as a 
benchmark. Similarly, a firm using model estimates can provide details on the numerator, 
denominator, time frame of the model, or any assumptions made on the income stream.  
                                                             
14 Examples include not reporting the value of investment properties separately and not specifying the 
methods used. These observations cannot be used as low disclosure cases, because we need data on the 
investment property and method used. These items are also mandatory. 
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To summarize, firms using the model approach can disclose a maximum of six items, 
firms using either the market or comparables approach can disclose a maximum of three 
items, firms using both the market and comparables approaches can disclose four items, firms 
combining the model approach with the market or comparables approach can disclose seven 
items, and firms using all methods can disclose eight items. Appendix 2 provides information 
about the variable definitions underlying the disclosure scores; Appendix 3 provides a real life 
example of how the scoring is done.  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the different combinations of fair value 
measurement choices (market prices (MV), comparable assets or transactions (COMP), or 
model estimates (MODEL)). First, in panel A, we focus on the number of fair value 
measurement methods used. We find that 31% of the sample of 372 firm-year observations 
use a combination of fair value methods, while the majority (69%) use only one. Furthermore, 
when only one method is used, most firms rely on model estimates to value investment 
property (218, or 59%). This suggests that market and comparable values are harder to obtain, 
as illustrated in panel B. Comparables are more often combined with model estimates (22% of 
firm-year observations) than with market inputs (1%), which confirms this inference.  
Table 2, panel C, reveals that only 45 firm-year observations (12%) use market values 
exclusively (NO_MODEL), 109 (29%) use market values in combination with model 
estimates (COMBINATION), and 218 (59%) use only model fair value (ONLY_MODEL). 
Property is more likely than any other non-financial asset class to be redeployed by other 
firms, and it therefore has relatively liquid markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992, Christensen 
and Nikolaev 2013). Moreover, investment properties have a more developed reference 
market and more developed valuation methodologies (Muller et al. 2011). This could explains 
why the fair value model is chosen over the cost model, and why model estimates are 




Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 provides a more detailed view of the measurement choices and of our 
disclosure index over time and across countries. All methods used differ significantly across 
countries (F-statistic significant at the 1% level). As expected, the market approach is 
primarily used in the U.K. This is most likely because U.K. firms are very familiar with fair 
value. For example, in contrast to firms in other countries, U.K. firms had to value investment 
property at fair value before IFRS adoption in 2005 (Kvaal and Nobes 2012). They also 
feature the most evolved property market in our sample. The Netherlands, the U.K, and Italy 
(countries where the market approach is more common) all featured a separate standard for 
investment property prior to IFRS. Furthermore, the exclusive use of model estimates is the 
primary choice in all countries except the U.K. (note that, in Finland and Sweden, firms do 
not use market values, they primarily use model estimates, or a combination with market fair 
value or comparables).  
The average disclosure index for the sample is 0.32 (median = 0.33), but significant 
differences exist among firms. Looking at the disclosure scores in Table 3 Panel A, Swedish 
firms have an average disclosure index of 0.59, the highest in our sample, followed by 
Belgian (0.50) and Finnish firms (0.48). German and Dutch firms disclose on average one-
third of the coded estimation parameters (0.30 and 0.32), while Italian and U.K. firms exhibit 
the lowest scores (0.14 and 0.18). The differences among countries is significant at the 1% 
level (F-stat = 9.59). These results are in line with Vergauwe and Gaeremynck (2013) and 
Sundgren et al. (2013).  
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Panel B shows a significant increase in disclosures after 2008, which is in line with 
Vergauwe and Gaeremynck (2013), and an overall improvement over time (F-stat = 26.74, 
significant at the 1% level). Disclosure scores in 2007 and 2008 (0.21 and 0.23) are similar, 
but increase in 2009 and 2010 (0.39 and 0.50, respectively). Panel B also shows a significant 
reduction over time in the use of market value (F-stat 3.42, significant at the 5% level), which 
could be explained by the market conditions during the time period studied. Over time, the 
relative importance of model estimates or the use of comparables remains unchanged.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
5. Research design  
In line with previous studies, we proxy for information asymmetry by looking at the capital 
market effect, i.e., market liquidity. Information asymmetry in a market reduces the 
willingness to trade, increases the difference between the prices at which investors are willing 
to sell and buy, and decreases the possibility of trading quickly without affecting price. 
Disclosure as an aspect of corporate financial transparency results in a decrease in information 
asymmetry by levelling the playing field among investors. Because it is beneficial to capital 
market participants, it generally increases market liquidity (Welker 1995, Healy and Palepu 
2001).  
 In developing our research design, we must consider that the potential causality 
between information asymmetry and the level of disclosure may give rise to endogeneity 
issues. Market liquidity, as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry, can influence the 
number of disclosures made (DISCLit). In other words, the disclosure strategy may be adapted 
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when market liquidity is low. This means that OLS results could be biased because the 
disclosure level is correlated with the error term of the OLS regression (Nikolaev and Van 
Lent 2005).  
We alleviate these concerns with DISCLit by using a 2SLS approach, where each 
observation represents a firm-year. We use the average level of measurement-related 
disclosures by country and year (DISCL_AVGit)
15 as an instrumental variable in equation (1). 
The use of industry averages is common in the compensation literature, where they can proxy 
for CEO compensation or incentives (e.g., Kini and Williams 2012). Similarly, the average 
level of measurement-related disclosure is an appropriate instrument for the following 
reasons.  
First, a firm is more likely to disclose information if similar firms engage in the same 
practice. Empirical research has documented isomorphism in disclosure behaviour within the 
real estate industry (Vergauwe and Gaeremynck 2013). Thus, industry peers obviously 
influence firm disclosure behaviour. Second, although disclosures may be strongly related to 
the practices of peers, a firm’s level of information asymmetry or liquidity is not likely to be 
directly influenced by the disclosure behaviour of other firms in a particular country or year. 
We therefore expect a positive association between the instrument DISCL_AVGit and DISCLit.  
The first stage of the 2SLS model looks as follows:  
  
                                                             
15 Including a firm-year observation’s disclosure level to calculate DISCL_AVGit could lead to 
mechanical association in the first stage, especially when a country-year includes few observations. 
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In the second stage, we use the predicted value of DISCL, which we denote PDISCL, 
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To test our hypothesis, and in line with previous studies, we use three different proxies 
for information asymmetry (INFORMATION_ASYMMETRYit) in the second stage: the bid-ask 
spread, the proportion of zero return days, and the price impact of trades. While the bid-ask 
spread is a commonly used measure, zero returns and the price impact measure price 
illiquidity more directly (Lang et al. 2012, Bekaert et al. 2007). The bid-ask spread focuses on 
the difference in price between the bid and the ask and it is measured as the daily average of 
the difference between the two divided by the midpoint price. The proportion of trading days 
with zero returns is measured as the number of zero return trading days divided by total 
trading days. Price impact captures the ability of a market participant to trade in a stock 
without moving its price (Amihud 2002, Fu et al. 2012). It is measured as the daily absolute 
stock return divided by trading volume. Note that larger values for those proxies represent 
higher illiquidity and higher levels of information asymmetry. The proxies are measured over 
the one month after the filing of the annual report (see Appendix 1).  
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The variable PDISCLit is the predicted value of DISCLit, the disclosure index, obtained 
in the first stage. Higher values for DISCLit  imply more disclosure and we therefore expect a 
negative coefficient for β1. 
In the second stage, we also control for the fair value method used by including two 
binary indicators, ONLY_MODELit and COMBINATIONit. The reference category is 
NO_MODELit, and firms either use the model approach exclusively (ONLY_MODELit), a 
combination (COMBINATIONit) of model and other estimates, or no model estimates at all 
(NO_MODELit). We make no predictions about the signs of these indicators in the second 
stage, because the effects on information asymmetry are unclear ex ante. Market illiquidity 
can result in unreliable market prices (Plantin et al. 2008), but a higher level of discretion 
using model fair value can have the same effect (Song et al. 2010). 
Based on our hypothesis, we expect in equation (2) a negative coefficient for the 
interaction variables β2*PDISCLit*COMBINATIONit and β3*PDISCL*ONLY_MODELit, and 
that the former will be more negative than the latter.  
Next, we include a general disclosure score, GDSit, to control for general disclosure 
levels. This proxy measures method-independent investment property-related disclosures. The 
general disclosure score is based on five voluntary items: 1) an appraiser report, 2) the name 
of the appraiser, 3) a reference used as an external benchmark, such as the international 
valuation standards (IVS) or the Royal Institute for Charted Surveyors (RICS), 4) the 
frequency of the investment property valuation, and 5) a sensitivity analysis. Firms receive a 
value of 1 for each disclosed item. We therefore expect higher scores and higher disclosures 
to have a positive effect and a negative coefficient for β6 in the second stage. Appendix 3 
includes an example of how the coding is done for the general disclosure score.  
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We also include a dummy variable FVBSit that takes the value of 1 if a firm uses fair 
value for measuring investment property in the balance sheet, and 0 otherwise, and IPit, the 
scaled amount of investment properties in the balance sheet. Given the results of previous 
studies (Israeli 2015, Müller et al. 2015), we expect market participants to rely more heavily 
on recognized fair values than on disclosed fair values; this results in an expected positive 
coefficient on FVBSit. We make no predictions about the sign on IPit in the second stage. 
 The regression model also includes four control variables used in other information 
asymmetry studies. We include Ln(VOLATILITYit) and Ln(TURNOVERit) as proxies for stock 
liquidity (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Muller and Riedl 2002, Welker 1995). We expect to 
observe lower information asymmetry when the standard deviation of daily returns is smaller 
and the number of shares traded is larger. Accordingly, we expect β9 > 0 and β10 < 0 in the 
second stage (equation 2).  
The characteristics of the investor environment are captured by the free float16 
(FREE_FLOATit) (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Muller et al. 2011), while total market 
capitalization (Ln(MARKET_CAPit)) controls for the information environment (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). We expect β11 < 0 and β12 < 0 in the second stage. The latter capital market 
variables are measured over the one month after the filing of the annual report (see Appendix 
1).  
We also include a variable AUDITFEEit, the natural logarithm of the audit fee, to 
control for audit quality in the second stage. Although theory predicts that higher audit effort 
                                                             
16 Including the number of institutional stock holders and the number of analysts following a firm can 
lead to a significant decrease in sample size due to missing observations.  
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increases audit quality (e.g., Dye 1993, Hillegeist 1999), empirical evidence is mixed (Lobo 
and Zhao 2013, Stanley and DeZoort 2007). We therefore do not predict a sign for β13. 
In the first stage, equation (1), we add our chosen instrument and all independent 
variables. We do not predict a sign for α2 and α 3. It is a priori unclear if firms facing more 
measurement uncertainty will choose to disclose more information on the underlying 
estimate. Next, we expect a positive coefficient for method-independent investment property-
related disclosures (α 4). Moreover, we predict a positive coefficient for α 5 and α 6 as firms 
will provide more disclosure on recognized rather than disclosed values and on more material 
assets (Vergauwe and Gaeremynck 2013).  Based on prior literature we also expect firms 
operating in a less volatile environment (α 7), fims with a higher turnover (α 8), larger firms (α 
9), and firms with more shares outstanding (α 10) to provide more disclosure (e.g. Archembault 
and Archembault 2003, Vergauwe and Garemynck 2013). Finally, higher audit effort (α 11) as 
a proxy for audit quality is expected to increase the level of disclosure (Dunn and Mayhew 
2004). 
 In both stages, we control for year and firm fixed effects, and error terms are clustered 
by firm.17 Including firm fixed effects has the primary advantage of helping control for time-
invariant unobservable factors at the firm level (Lang et al. 2012).  
                                                             
17 Results are robust to clustering by country. We do not cluster by country in our main analysis. This 
is because De George et al. (2016) claim that it can yield biased standard errors unless there are 
enough countries in the sample (the number of countries mentioned is 40 (p. 991)). Results with two-
way clustering (by year and firm) continue to hold, but standard errors and model tests should be 
interpreted with caution, because the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is not of full 




6.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and control variables used in 
our primary model. The average firm has a spread of 0.04, 22% of zero return days, and a 
price impact of 0.02. Average turnover and volatility equal 0.001 and 0.03, respectively. 
Average market capitalization is €764 million, while the average free float is 57.70%.18 82% 
of firms report fair value in the balance sheet, and the average ratio of investment property 
over total assets is 73%. Finally, the mean general disclosure score is 0.46, with a standard 
deviation of 0.27. Disclosure scores are the highest in Sweden, Finland and Belgium followed 
by Norway, the UK and the Netherlands. Germany and Italy have the lowest scores. Similar 
to measurement-related disclosures we note higher scores in 2009 and 2010.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 5 documents a significant and negative 
correlation between our disclosure index and our information asymmetry proxies: the bid-ask 
spread, the proportion of zero return days, and the price impact, all significant at the 1% level. 
We also detect a positive significant correlation between NO_MODELit and all output proxies 
(at the 5% and 10% levels).  
                                                             
18 The bid-ask spread, price impact, turnover, volatility, market capitalization, and audit fees are 
heavily skewed. We therefore use a log-transformation in line with previous research (e.g., Muller et 
al. 2011). Results are robust to winsorizing unbounded variables at the 1% level. Results are robust to 
using a log-transformation for the proportion of zero return days. 
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When ONLY_MODELit or COMBINATIONit is used, we only find a significant 
negative correlation between ONLY_MODELit  and the proportion of zero return days (at the 
5% level), but using a combination of methods is weakly negatively correlated with the bid-
ask spread and the price impact (at the 10% level).  
Finally, the correlations between the different control variables and the three output 
proxies are in line with expectations and consistent over the different proxies.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
6.2. Multivariate results 
Table 6 reports the first- and second-stage estimations of the 2SLS.  
 Our chosen instrument, disclosure of the industry in a certain year, seems appropriate. 
It loads strongly on the instrumented variable (coefficient = 0.512, t-statistic = 4.07), with a 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic of 26.39, which exceeds the largest Stock and Yogo (2005) 
critical values of 16.38.19 Moreover, our first-stage regression provides some interesting 
insights into the determinants of disclosure.  
In column 1, we observe that firms using model estimates exclusively (coefficient = 
0.183, t-statistic = 2.46) or in combination with another method (coefficient = 0.165, t-statistic 
= 1.97) provide more details on the assumptions made20. Next, we find significant evidence 
                                                             
19 Stock and Yogo (2005) provide test results on the weakness of instruments that is based on a 
statistic attributable to Cragg and Donald (1993).  
20 The coefficient for ONLY_MODELit  is not significantly different from COMBINATIONit. 
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that firms with generally better disclosure levels (coefficient = 0.293, t-statistic = 3.00) 
provide more details on the assumptions used in the fair value process.  
Looking at PDISCLit  in the second stage of the 2SLS regression (equation 2), we only 
find a significantly negative correlation between the extent of disclosure and the bid-ask 
spread (coefficient = -0.287, t-stat = -2.30), excluding interaction terms (column 2).  
In terms of economic significance, a 10-percentage point increase in fair value-related 
disclosures is associated with a 2.87% decrease in the bid-ask spread. We fail to find similar 
results for the proportion of zero return days (coefficient = -0.118, t-statistic = -0.88) and the 
price impact as dependent variables (coefficient = -0.013, t-statistic = -0.17) in columns 4 and 
6. 
In columns 3, 5, and 7, we interact PDISCLit with ONLY_MODELit and 
COMBINATIONit to investigate whether more measurement-related disclosures are associated 
with a larger decrease in information asymmetry when model estimates are used exclusively 
than when other valuation methods are used. Our results show that when model estimates are 
used exclusively, more measurement-related disclosures result in a lower bid-ask spread 
(coefficient = -0.138, t-statistic = -2.10). However, we fail to find similar results for the other 
regressions. Not only do we find that more measurement-related disclosures result in a lower 
proportion of zero return days (coefficient = -0.169, t-statistic = -1.99) when model estimates 
are used exclusively, we also find a significant coefficient for PDISCLit*COMBINATIONit. 
Wald coefficient tests indicate that the coefficient on PDISCLit*ONLY_MODELit  and 
PDISCLit*COMBINATIONit are not statistically different. This result indicates that any use of 
model estimates (exclusively or in combination with another method) moderates the 
association between disclosure and the proportion of zero return days. The latter result is 
inconsistent with our hypothesis. We do not find any results for our price impact model. 
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With respect to our control variables, we find that lower volatility (Ln(VOLATILITYit), 
larger turnover (Ln(TURNOVERit), and larger market capitalization (Ln(MARKET_CAPit) are 
negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread and with price impact. Results also show that the 
balance sheet choice21 (FVBSit) has no impact on either output measure.
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Insert Table 6 about here 
To summarise, we find a consistent effect that the use of model estimates moderates 
the association between disclosure and the bid-ask spread and the proportion of zero return 
days, but no effect when using price impact. Contrary to our expectation, we fail to find 
evidence that more measurement-related disclosures are associated with a larger decrease in 
information asymmetry when model fair value is used exclusively than when other valuation 
methods are used.   
The lack of results may be because investors view the three methods similarly, as they 
all include some level of judgment or internal information. For example, the comparable 
assets method still requires judgment about the changes to be made to the asset. Alternatively, 
investors might not use additional information in the notes to the financial statement. 
                                                             
21 Selection bias could occur, however, because managers must choose between fair value in the 
balance sheet or in the notes. By investigating information asymmetry differences across both models, 
self-selection may positively influence our results. Results are robust to using a selection model for the 
recognition vs. disclosure choice followed by adding the inverse Mills ratios in equation (2).  
22 The latter may seem surprising, but is likely attributable to the characteristics of the accounting 
standard itself. In other words, fair value is provided either way, regardless of balance sheet 
accounting choice. Moreover, the firm-year observations from the cost model are all located in France 
or Germany, and only two firms changed their choice over time. Hence, this effect would be picked up 




6.3. Fair value disclosures and estimation errors 
In this section we provide an additional analysis to rule out that our lack of consistent results 
is due to reliability differences. If firms with less reliable estimates provide a different level of 
disclosure than firms with more reliable estimates this could explain our mixed results. 
Similarly to Dietrich et al. (2000) and Muller et al. (2011), we examine the degree to which 
the selling price of investment properties diverges from its reported fair value, and whether 
this divergence varies with fair value disclosure. Fair value is defined as “the amount for 
which an asset or liability could be exchanged between knowledgeable, willing parties in an 
arm's length transaction.” Hence, when an asset is sold in the market, the selling price should 
equal the fair value of that asset if the estimate is reliable.  
Of our initial sample of 372 firm-year observations, we obtain 184 that sold property 
in the same fiscal year, and provide details on selling prices and fair values of the assets sold. 
We manually collect data on the recorded fair values of the asset sold, the selling price (SPit), 
and the gains (or losses) realized (FVGit (FVLit)) on the transactions. The measurement error 
of the fair value estimate is then measured as |FVGit (FVLit)/SPit|. We compare the variance of 
measurement errors between firm-year observations with high and low disclosure (Dietrich et 
al. 2000, Muller et al. 2011). 
 Our sample consists of larger firms that hold more investment properties. These firms 
have lower information asymmetry, better liquidity, higher turnover, lower volatility, and a 
higher free float. The proportion of firms opting for the fair value model is also higher, as is 
their general disclosure level.  
 Table 7 compares the standard deviations across various subsamples. We first assign 
firm-year observations to high (low) disclosure indicators if DISCLit is above or equal to 
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(below) the annual median value of DISCLit. We then test the differences in standard 
deviation between firms with high and low levels of disclosure.  
For the full sample, we observe a significant difference in measurement errors 
between high and low disclosing observations (p-value = 0.04). These results indicate that 
estimates are more reliable when firms provide more disclosure. For the subsample of firms 
using model fair value only, we continue to find significantly lower measurement errors for 
firms that provide more extensive disclosures (p-value = 0.02). We fail to find comparable 
results for the group of firms that use a combination of model and market inputs (p-value = 
0.18).  
Results indicate that firms that provide more disclosures sell their investment 
properties at prices closer to book value (fair value) than other firms. This difference is more 
pronounced for firms that use model estimates exclusively. In other words, the benefit of 
more disclosure appears to be larger when uncertainty is higher. This evidence suggest that if 
capital market participants ignore the additional disclosure this is not in their best interest as 
firms with more reliable fair value estimates provide more disclosure especially when model 
estimates are used exclusively. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
6.4. Sensitivity analyses 
In this section, we perform a number of sensitivity analyses. First, we test the sensitivity of 
our results to alternative measures for disclosure. Second, we use alternative control variables, 





6.4.1. Alternative measures of measurement-related and general disclosures 
We repeat our analyses using different proxies for measurement-related disclosures. First, we 
replace our disclosure index with an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses more 
than the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in both stages. We find that for the bid-ask spread 
model and zero return model both coefficients on PDISCLit*ONLY_MODELit are negative 
and statistically significant. However, the results are insignificant for the price impact model. 
As for the test on the difference between the two interaction variables, we find a significant 
difference; this is consistent with our main hypothesis. We also replace the index with an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm discloses anything, zero otherwise in both stages. 
Again, we find results in line with our main results and evidence consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
Second, we exclude items one-by-one from our DISCLit variable in both stages. Our 
main results hold, which shows the results are not driven by a single disclosure item.  
Finally, we separately include the different components of the general disclosure score 
in the second stage. We do not find significant results for the components of GDSit, but the 
main results remain unchanged. Again we fail to find evidence for our main hypothesis. 
 
6.4.2. Alternative control variables  
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by including different control variables.  
First, results for the bid-ask spread model are robust to including scaled audit fees 
rather than the natural logarithm of audit fees, but are weaker for the zero return model. We 
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also fail to find significant results for the audit fees. In line with our main analyses, we fail to 
find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. 
Second, to control for disclosure levels for firms using a method for the first time, we 
include three categorical variables. For each method, we include a variable that equals 1 if a 
firm begins using the method for the first time, 0 if a firm continues to use the method, and -1 
if a firm stops using the method. Our main results continue to hold, and we do not find 
significant effects for the three new variables, nor do we find evidence consistent with our 
main hypothesis.  
 
6.4.3. Alternative samples  
In the next set of robustness tests, we consider different subsamples. First, we limit our 
sample to the group of 305 firm-year observations using fair value as a measurement choice in 
the balance sheet. As Clor-Proell and Maines (2014) point out, managers may provide 
different information when recognizing values if they feel they are held to a different 
reliability standard under recognition versus disclosure. Moreover, auditors’ efforts and 
acceptance of errors can also differ (Libby et al. 2006). For this group of firms, we confirm 
the results for the main analysis: More extensive measurement-related disclosures result in a 
lower bid-ask spread and proportion of zero return days for firms using model estimates. We 
fail to find significant results for the group of firms applying the cost model, but we note this 
could be due to the lack of statistical power (N = 67). We fail to find a significant difference 
between both interaction terms. In other words, disclosure is negatively associated with the 
bid-ask spread and the proportion of zero return days and this association is stronger for any 
use of model estimates. Again, this is inconsistent with our hypothesis.   
28 
 
 Second, we are unable to collect data for all the Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish 
firms due to language problems. Thus, we posit there may be a bias toward large international 
firms with more extensive disclosures present in our primary sample. To mitigate this 
concern, we re-estimate the main model for a subsample that excludes countries for which we 
cannot collect all the annual reports in the real estate industry in English, French, German, or 
Dutch (N = 344). The results for both the bid-ask spread and the zero return model hold, but 
we nevertheless fail to find evidence supporting our main hypothesis that the coefficient on 
PDISCLit*ONLY_MODELit  is more negative than the coefficient on 
PDISCLit*COMBONATIONit. 
 Third, to ensure that our coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are driven by 
changes in disclosure, and not changes in the fair value measurement method, we re-test our 
main models on a subsample of firms that does not change its fair value method during our 
sample period. More specifically, we test our hypothesis on the sample of 123 firms that use 
ONLY_MODELit for the entire sample period. Note, however, that we require information on 
the current and previous method used. This reduces our sample significantly because it is not 
fully balanced. This model also does not include interaction terms because the method 
remains constant. We continue to find a significantly negative coefficient for PDISCLit in the 
bid-ask spread model, which confirms our main analyses. 
Next, we re-test our main model for the 74 firms that use COMBINATIONit for the 
entire sample period. We again continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on 
PDISCLit in the bid-ask spread model. Our results do not hold for the zero return model or the 
price impact model.  
 
6.4.4. Alternative research design 
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Finally, we test the robustness of our results to changes in the first stage. 
 First, we eliminate valuation model choice variables from the first stage, because they 
may be co-determined with the level of disclosure, which in turn can be affected by 
information asymmetry. Our instrument still loads strongly on the instrumented variable 
(coefficient = 0.445, t-statistic = 3.47). Moreover, our main results for the second stage 
remain unchanged for the bid-ask spread model and the proportion of zero return days. We 
fail to find results for our main hypothesis as the coefficients on both 
PDISCLit*ONLY_MODELit  and PDISCLit*COMBINATIONit are not significantly different. 
 Second, we use the median disclosure level by country and year in the first stage rather 
than the mean. Our results again continue to hold for both the bid-ask spread model used, and 
the zero return model. We again fail to find evidence consistent with our main hypothesis.  
   
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether the association between measurement-related fair value 
disclosures and information asymmetry varies with the fair value measurement method 
chosen. Our study is motivated by the interests of standard setters and by academics in the 
controversy over fair value as a basis for measurement. We are particularly interested in 
whether a conceptual basis, such as IFRS, without detailed disclosure rules, can lead to the 
generation of useful information for the capital markets.  
We focus on investment property in the real estate industry, because it is a setting in 
which fair value relates to the most material asset. We start by documenting the fair value 
measurement choices and disclosure levels across our sample in detail.  
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We then investigate the association between measurement-related disclosures and 
different proxies for information asymmetry, i.e. the bid-ask spread, the proportion of zero 
return days, and the price impact. Our evidence suggests that measurement-related disclosures 
are associated with certain information asymmetry proxies. However, we fail to find 
consistent evidence that this link is more pronounced when model fair value is used 
exclusively, which is where information uncertainty is the highest. More specifically, our 
results show a negative association between measurement-related disclosures and the bid-ask 
spread, especially when model estimates are used exclusively. However, we only find a 
negative association between measurement-related disclosures and the proportion of zero 
return days for firms that use model estimates (exclusively or in combination with another 
method) and no association with the price impact. 
Our lack of results could be an indication that the additional disclosure is not used by 
investors. Differences between selling prices and reported fair values are lower for firms that 
provide more disclosures, especially when model estimates are used. The latter analysis 
shows that if our lack of results is due to capital market participants not using these additional 
disclosures this is not in their best interest. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, we use a rather restrictive sample size 
spread over a limited number of European countries. Further studies may wish to focus on a 
broader set of countries to investigate whether the results hold in other institutional settings. 
Second, we study a crisis period during which the market was overly illiquid; it is not clear 
whether our results would hold in other periods. Time series analysis could also shed light on 
changes in the information asymmetry effects over time.  
Third, we conduct the fair value analysis at an aggregate level, because we are unable 
to collect measurement-related disclosures for each investment property separately. However, 
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the level of aggregation works against our results. We find that model fair value disclosures 
can result in lower information asymmetry, even at an aggregate level.  
Fourth, in developing our research design, we must consider that the potential 
causality between information asymmetry and the level of disclosure may give rise to 
endogeneity issues. We use a 2SLS design, but we acknowledge that finding a good 
instrument is a difficult task (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Furthermore, we look at disclosures 
related to investment property valuation in the real estate industry. Whether the results hold 
for other principles-based settings, such as employee benefits (in which disclosures are 
expected to be useful), remains an open question.  
Finally, results need to be interpreted with caution as Krinsky and Lee (1996) 
decompose the bid-ask spread into three components (adverse selection cost, inventory 
holding cost and order processing cost) and our analyses do not show which component is 
driving our results. Despite these limitations, we believe our setting provides an interesting 
avenue for future research.  
Given the introduction of IFRS 13, it would also be interesting to test whether our 
main results hold, and how the introduction of IFRS 13 impacts fair value disclosures in the 
real estate industry. Finally, we only look at one capital market effect, i.e., information 
asymmetry and the liquidity of a firm’s stock. There could be other benefits and costs 
associated with increased measurement-related disclosures such as a reduced cost of capital or 
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Variable names Definitions and Estimations 





We obtain the closing bid and ask prices for 
each day from Datastream, and compute the 
daily quoted spread as the difference between 
the two prices divided by the midpoint price. 
We then compute the average daily spread 
over the month after the filing of the annual 
report.  








Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., daily 
absolute stock return divided by trading 
volume (in thousands)). Following Daske et 
al. (2008), we use the median value over the 
month after the filing of the annual report, 
and we exclude zero return days. 
Logarithm of the price impact. 
ZERO_RETURN Proportion of trading days with zero daily 
stock returns out of all potential trading days 
over the month after filing of the annual 
report. 
  
Control and test variables  
AUDITFEE Fees paid to the auditor in thousands. 
Ln(AUDITFEE) Natural logarithm of the total audit fee. 
COMBINATION Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm uses both model and non-model 
estimates to estimate fair value, and 0 
otherwise. 
COMP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
comparable prices or assets were used to 
estimate fair value, and 0 otherwise. 





We obtain the percentage of shares readily 
available for trading from Datastream and 
take the average free float over the month 
after the filing of the fiscal year. 
FVBS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the fair value model is applied, and 0 if the 
cost model is applied. 
GDS General disclosure index as defined in 
Appendix 2. 
IP Total amount of investment property in the 
balance sheet scaled by total assets. 
Market_Cap 
 
We obtain the daily market capitalization 






Euros), and average the market capitalization 
over the month after the filing of the fiscal 
year. 
Logarithm of the market capitalization. 
MODEL Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
model estimates were used to estimate fair 
value, and 0 otherwise. 
MV Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
market value and market inputs were used to 
estimate fair value. 
NO_MODEL Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm does not use model estimates to estimate 
fair value, and 0 otherwise. 
ONLY_MODEL Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm uses model estimates exclusively to 
estimate fair value, and 0 otherwise. 
TURNOVER We obtain the number of shares traded and 
outstanding for each day from Datastream (in 
thousands), and compute the turnover as the 
ratio of shares traded by shares outstanding. 
We then compute the average daily ratio over 
the month after the filing of the annual 
report. 





We obtain returns for each day from 
Datastream, and compute the standard 
deviation over the month after the filing of 
the annual report.  










0/1 Details on similar or comparable property or 
transactions used to estimate fair value. 
Market yield 0/1 This yield is based on the market income of the 
property and is publicly available. Market 
income is the net income that reflects the 
market rent level at the time of purchase. 
Occupancy 
rate 
0/1 Occupancy rate: percentage of property rented 
out. 
Income 0/1 Details on the cash flows or rental income used 
in model estimation.  
Discount rate 0/1 Discount rate used in model estimation.  
Time frame 0/1 Predicted time frame over which income (the 
cash flow) is capitalized (discounted). 
Income 
assumptions 
0/1 Assumptions on the rental income of the firms. 
General disclosures 
REPORT 0/1 Report by the appraiser on the valuation 
procedure. 
REFERENCE 0/1 Reference to external valuation guidelines. 
NAME 0/1 Name of the independent appraiser. 
APPRAISAL 0/1 Number of times the property was reappraised 
per year. 







Examples of the computation of the disclosure index for Leaseinvest Real Estate 2010 
 
Information in the notes 
“Investment properties are stated at fair value in accordance with IAS 40.” 
“An external independent real estate valuer determines, upon request of management, every 
quarter, the investment value of the property, (this term corresponds to the previously used 
term ‘investment value’), i.e. costs, transfer taxes and fees included.” 
“The valuers carry out their valuation on the basis of the method of calculating the present 
value of the rental income in accordance with the International Valuation Standards 2005, 
issued by the International Valuation Standards Committee as set out in the corresponding 
report.” 
“In accordance with the opinion of the working group of the Belgian Association of Asset 
Managers ‘BEAMA…” 
“The average remaining duration of the rental contracts amounts to 3.8 years.” 
 
Information in the appraiser report (Cushman and Wakefield) 
“Our valuation methodology is the capitalisation of the market rent.”  … “We based ourselves 
on comparables that were available at the date of valuation.” 
“The occupancy rate of the total portfolio (excluding the Projects) is 97.45% (respectively 
96.35% and 98.97% for the Belgian and the Luxembourg portfolios).” 
“On this basis, the initial yield of the complete portfolio (excluding the Projects) in terms of 
investment value is 7.22% (with 7.72% and 6.62%, respectively, for the Belgian and 
Luxembourg portfolios) and the initial yield of the complete portfolio in terms of fair value is 





Panel A: Identification of items disclosed 
VARIABLE VALUE Disclosed by Leaseinvest real estate? 
Measurement-related disclosures 
Benchmark details 0/1 0 
Market yield 0/1 1 
Occupancy rate 0/1 1 
Income 0/1 0 
Discount rate 0/1 0 
Time frame 0/1 1 
Income assumptions 0/1 0 
SUM 7 3 
General disclosures 
REPORT 0/1 1 
REFERENCE 0/1 1 
NAME 0/1 1 
APPRAISAL 0/1 1 
SENSITIVITY 0/1 0 
SUM 5 4 
 
Panel B: Disclosure scores  
 Leaseinvest real estate 
DISCL 0.43 
Actual score 3 
Maximum score 7 
GDS 0.8 
Actual score 4 





Table 1. Sample description 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Data requirements Number of firm-year 
observations 
European real estate firm-year observations with reports in German, 
French, English, or Dutch for fiscal years 2007 to 2010 
-Less: 
544 
Unavailable copies of financial statements, incorrect reporting, no use of 
IAS 40, change in fiscal year-end 
-64 
Missing hand-collected disclosure data -40 
Missing Datastream data -68 
Main sample  372 
  
-No sales of investment property  
Measurement error sample 184 
Panel B: Sample composition  
 UK FR GER BE NL NO FI SW IT Total 
2007 15 28 22 13 8 3 2 4 0 95 
2008 17 32 20 14 10 3 2 4 3 105 
2009 14 25 17 13 10 2 3 4 2 90 
2010 9 28 14 14 9 3 2 3 0 82 
Total 55 113 73 54 37 11 9 15 5 372 
Notes: This table reports the sample selection and number of observations per country and year. UK: 
United Kingdom; FR: France; GER: Germany; BE: Belgium; NL: The Netherlands; NO: Norway, 
SW: Sweden, FI: Finland; IT: Italy. 2007: companies that have a fiscal year-end between 30 June 
2007 and 30 June 2008; 2008: companies that have a fiscal year-end between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 
2009; 2009: companies that have a fiscal year-end between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010. 2010: 




Table 2. Fair value measurement choices for investment property made 
Panel A: Number of fair value methods used by firm-year observations  
  Firm-year observations % 
1 Method 258 69% 
2 Methods 106 29% 
3 Methods 8 2% 
Total 372 100% 
Panel B: Fair value measurement choices disclosed in the notes by number of methods used  
  Firm-year observations % 
1 method 
  
MV 32 8% 
COMP 8 2% 
MODEL 218 59% 
TOTAL 1 method 258 69% 
2 methods 
  
MV and COMP 5 1% 
MV and MODEL 21 6% 
COMP and MODEL 80 22% 
TOTAL 2 methods 106 29% 
TOTAL 3 methods 8 2% 
Panel C: Fair value measurement choices  
  ONLY_MODEL 218 59% 
COMBINATION 109 29% 
NO_MODEL 45 12% 
TOTAL 372 100% 
Notes: This table reports the number of firm-year observations (and percentage of firms) that use the 
same method for all of their properties, two different methods, or all methods, respectively. Our 
sample consists of 372 European real estate firm-year observations. MV is the market value method, 
COMP is the comparable prices or assets method, MODEL is the model estimates method, 
ONLY_MODEL is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if firms use MODEL only, and 0 
otherwise, COMBINATION is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if firms use MODEL 
combined with another method, and 0 otherwise, NO_MODEL is an indicator variable that takes the 




Table 3. Fair value measurement choices and disclosure index  
Panel A: Fair value measurement choice and average disclosure index by country 
 UK FR GER BE NL NO FI SW IT F-stat Total 
MV 0.56 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.18 0 0 0.20 13.93***  
COMP 0.20 0.48 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.09 0 0.07 0.80 8.03***  
MODEL 0.38 0.97 0.98 1 0.79 0.90 1 1 1 30.61***  
ONLY_MODEL 0.16 0.48 0.86 0.66 0.49 0.72 1 0.93 0.20 12.24***  
COMBINATION 0.22 0.49 0.12 0.34 0.30 0.18 0 0.07 0.80 6.58***  
NO_MODEL 0.62 0.03 0.02 0 0.21 0.10 0 0 0 15.76***  
            
DISCL 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.50 0.32 0.44 0.48 0.59 0.14 9.59***  
Total 55 113 73 54 37 11 9 15 5  372 
 
Panel B: Fair value measurement choice and average disclosure index by year 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 F-stat Total 
MV 0.23 0.21 0.10 0.10 3.42**  
COMP 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.34 1.65  
MODEL 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.92 1.24  
ONLY_MODEL 0.57 0.54 0.63 0.56 0.36  
COMBINATION 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.96  
NO_MODEL 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 2.77**  
       
DISCL 0.21 0.23 0.39 0.50 26.74***  
Total 95 105 90 82  372 
Notes: Panel A of this table reports the percentage of firm-year observations that use a particular method and the disclosure index by country (country codes 
are as defined in Table 1), and the total number of firm-year observations. Panel B reports the percentage of firm-year observations that use a particular 
method and the disclosure index by year, as well as total number of firm-year observations. Our sample consists of 372 European real estate firm-year 
observations. MV is the market value method, COMP is the comparable prices or assets method, MODEL is the model estimates method, ONLY_MODEL is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if firms use MODEL only, and 0 otherwise, COMBINATION is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
firms use MODEL combined with another method, and 0 otherwise, NO_MODEL is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm does not use 
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MODEL, and 0 otherwise, DISCL is the disclosure index. **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. More 





Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Dependent and control variables 
 Mean Stand. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Bid_ask_spread 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Ln(BID_AK_SPREAD) -4.22 1.40 -5.09 -4.19 -3.39 
ZERO_RETURN 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.33 
Price_Impact 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ln(PRICE_IMPACT) -0.93 3.31 -3.31 -0.31 1.41 
Turnover 0.001 0.004 0.0001 0.0004 0.002 
Ln(TURNOVER) -7.89 1.83 -9.14 -7.79 -6.44 
Volatility 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Ln(VOLATILITY) -3.93 0.76 -4.40 -3.96 -3.47 
FREE_FLOAT 57.70 29.07 33.00 59.39 84.18 
Market_Cap 764288.93 1641409.24 63904.81 207138.34 643906.47 
Ln(MARKET_CAP) 12.21 1.75 11.07 12.24 13.38 
GDS 0.46 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.60 
FVBS 0.82 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AUDITFEE 649.03 3937.28 80.00 160.00 379.50 
Ln(AUDITFEE) 5.21 1.30 4.38 5.08 5.94 
IP 0.73 0.30 0.59 0.87 0.94 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on our dependent and control variables. Our sample consists of 372 European real estate firm-year observations. 




Table 5. Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Ln(BID_ASK_SPREAD) 
(1) 
1              
ZERO_RETURN (2) 0.591*** 1             
Ln(PRICE_IMPACT) (3) 0.836*** 0.563*** 1            
DISCL (4) -0.276*** -0.252*** -0.297*** 1           
ONLY_MODEL (5) -0.028 -0.163** -0.035 0.285*** 1          
COMBINATION (6) -0.120* -0.002 -0.124* 0.037 -0.616*** 1         
NO_MODEL (7) 0.158** 0.158** 0.103* -0.095 -0.339*** -0.211*** 1        
GDS (8) -0.295*** -0.200*** -0.344*** 0.481*** 0.051 0.164** 0.029 1       
FVBS (9) 0.006 -0.001 -0.032 0.188*** -0.053 0.076 0.120* 0.253*** 1      
Ln(VOLATILITY) (10) 0.385*** 0.081 0.331*** -0.265*** -0.092 -0.104* 0.089 -0.315*** -0.042 1     
Ln(TURNOVER) (11) -0.483*** -0.436*** -0.642*** 0.038 -0.097 -0.045 0.149** 0.140** 0.023 0.155** 1    
Ln(MARKET_CAP) (12) -0.777*** -0.578*** -0.791*** 0.346*** 0.099 0.156** -0.193*** 0.317*** -0.020 -0.336*** 0.257*** 1   
FREE_FLOAT (13) -0.264*** -0.290*** -0.285*** 0.071 0.029 -0.091 0.061 0.157** 0.093 0.059 0.391*** 0.118* 1  
Ln(AUDITFEE) (14) -0.464*** -0.424*** -0.373*** 0.118* 0.051 0.128* -0.140** -0.021 -0.108* -0.031 0.093 0.557*** 0.003 1 
IP (15) -0.214*** -0.208*** -0.247*** 0.343*** 0.174*** 0.002 0.011 0.495*** 0.257*** -0.186*** 0.061 0.302*** 0.150** -0.044 
Notes: This table reports Pearson rank correlation coefficients for all variables. Our sample consists of 372 European real estate firm-year observations. *, **, and *** denote statistical 




Table 6. Multivariate results: The impact of method-related disclosures on the bid-ask spread, proportion of zero return days, and price impact 
First Stage  Ln(BID_ASK_SPREAD) ZERO_RETURN Ln(PRICE_IMPACT) 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PDISCL  -0.287** -0.163* -0.118 0.050 -0.013 -0.055 






















































GDS 0.293*** 0.070 0.073* 0.032 0.034 0.043 0.044 
 (3.00) (1.30) (1.68) (0.43) (0.48) (1.06) (1.09) 
FVBS 0.109 -0.126 -0.138 0.036 0.021 -0.094 -0.091 
 (0.72) (-1.28) (-1.61) (0.58) (0.39) (-0.94) (-0.92) 
Ln(VOLATILITY) -0.006 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.022 0.026 0.129*** 0.126*** 
 (-0.10) (3.36) (3.91) (0.54) (0.65) (3.28) (3.26) 
Ln(TURNOVER) 0.022 -0.327*** -0.325*** 0.102* 0.093* -0.373*** -0.367*** 
 (0.16) (-4.11) (-4.90) (1.79) (1.68) (-6.80) (-6.76) 
Ln(MARKET_CAP) 0.167 -0.436*** -0.435*** 0.047 0.052 -0.596*** -0.598*** 
 (1.33) (-3.21) (-3.56) (0.66) (0.78) (-7.62) (-7.79) 
FREE_FLOAT 0.118 -0.032 -0.034 0.069 0.064 -0.059* -0.058* 
 (1.33) (-0.49) (-0.64) (1.12) (1.12) (-1.71) (-1.67) 
Ln(AUDITFEE) 0.097 -0.035 -0.037 -0.024 -0.016 0.003 -0.002 
 (1.01) (-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.69) (-0.46) (0.09) (-0.06) 
IP 0.022 0.040 0.033 0.087 0.108* 0.071** 0.056 
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Table 6 (Continued)        
 (0.10) (0.51) (0.61) (1.23) (1.69) (2.12) (1.55) 
Intercept YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 
Adjusted R2 0.632 0.854 0.889 0.862 0.872 0.916 0.917 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 26.39       
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.38       











Notes: Our sample consists of 372 European real estate firm-year observations. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7. Method-related disclosures and estimation errors  
 Full sample ONLY_MODEL sample COMBINATION sample 
Estimation error Variance p-value Variance p-value Variance p-value 
  0.04  0.02  0.18 
High disclosure 0.02  0.03  0.05  
Low disclosure 0.04  0.09  0.07  
Notes: We test for equality of variances of estimation errors for different disclosure levels. Our sample 
consists of 184 European real estate firm-year observations; 95 use only model estimate, and 53 use a 
combination. Estimation error is the absolute value of the fair value gain (FVG) or loss (FVL) realized 
over the actual selling price (SP) for assets sold during the fiscal year; or abs(FVGit (FVLit)/SPit), High 
(Low) disclosure is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm provides more (less) disclosure 
than the sample median. More details on the disclosure variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
